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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Kenneth James appeals the denial of his motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea.  He argues that the District Court of 
the Virgin Islands erred as a matter of law and abused its 
discretion in declining to grant the motion.  We disagree and 
will affirm. 
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I. BACKGROUND 
 
James arranged to sell cocaine to someone who turned 
out to be a confidential informant of the Drug Enforcement 
Agency (“DEA”).  After several phone calls and 
conversations between James and the informant, James 
brought a bag containing 12 kilograms of cocaine to a hotel 
room where the informant was staying.  James proceeded to 
negotiate a per-kilo price with the informant, settling on 
$13,500, and sold him the contents of the bag.  DEA agents 
immediately arrived on the scene, seized the bag containing 
the cocaine, and arrested James.  As far as criminal records 
show, that was his first encounter with the justice system.   
 
The government filed a two-count information 
charging James in Count I with conspiracy to distribute 
narcotics, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, and in Count II 
with possession with intent to distribute narcotics, in violation 
of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).  He initially pled not guilty.  Four 
months later, however, he made a motion to change his plea.  
Pursuant to a plea agreement, he sought to plead guilty to 
Count I, which specifically charged a “conspir[acy] to possess 
with intent to distribute more than five kilograms of 
cocaine[.]”  (App. at 34.)   
 
The District Court convened a change-of-plea hearing 
and asked James about his education level.  He responded that 
he had completed the third grade and that he could read and 
write in English.  The Court confirmed that James had an 
opportunity to have the documents associated with the change 
of plea explained to him and that he was satisfied with the 
representation provided by his attorney, David Cattie.  The 
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Court then confirmed that no one had made any promises or 
threats to prompt James to change his plea and that he was 
doing so of his own free will.  The Court also explained the 
charges and the possible penalties for the offenses, as well as 
James’s right to a trial and the rights he would have if he went 
to trial.  At each step, James said he understood.   
 
The Court next noted that, as part of the plea 
agreement, James was “agree[ing] to waive [his] right to 
appeal any sentence imposed by the Court up to the statutory 
maximum on any ground whatever … [and his] right to 
petition [for post-conviction relief] under Title 28 US Code 
Section 2255, with the exception of a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel[.]”  (App. at 59.)  James again said he 
understood.   
 
To establish the factual foundation for the guilty plea, 
the Court asked the government to recite what it would prove 
if the case were to proceed to trial.  The Assistant United 
States Attorney stated that 
 
the defendant, Kenneth James, arranged with 
individuals unknown, to provide approximately 
12 kilograms of cocaine to a DEA confidential 
source.  After several phone calls and 
conversations between Kenneth James and the 
confidential source, Kenneth James arrived at 
the hotel where the confidential source was 
staying, entered the room carrying a bag that 
contained approximately 12 kilograms of 
cocaine, which Kenneth James then proceeded 
to sell to the confidential source.  Kenneth 
James negotiated to sell each kilo of cocaine to 
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the confidential source for $13,500.  After 
Kenneth James entered the hotel room, and the 
confidential source verified the cocaine was 
indeed in the bag, DEA agents arrived on scene 
and recovered the bag containing the 12 bricks 
of cocaine. 
(App. at 60-61.)  James agreed that the government’s 
statement of facts was “true and accurate,” and he entered a 
plea of guilty, which the Court accepted.  (App. at 63.) 
 
Several months later, but before he was sentenced, 
James filed a pro se motion captioned “motion to dismiss 
counsel based upon ineffectiveness of counsel[.]”  (App. at 
49.)  In it, he asserted his innocence and provided three 
reasons to explain why he had pled guilty to a crime he was 
now saying he did not commit.  First, he said that he was 
placed “under Duress to force [him] to take a plea of 
something[] that was never investigated in [his] favor.”  (App. 
at 49.)  He claimed that Cattie “forced [him] to tell [federal 
agents] that [he was] responsib[le] for a bag [of cocaine] that 
[wasn’t his.]”  (App. at 50.)  According to James, he pled 
guilty out of fear because “Cattie told [him] that … the 
[j]udge and [j]ury would not believe [him] … because the 
[j]udge supports corruption[.]”1  (App. at 49-50.)  Second, 
                                                 
1  More particularly, James asserted that Cattie made 
several misrepresentations regarding the District Court, 
including telling James “that [he] need[ed] to take a plea 
because [the Judge] … ‘supports corruption’”; that “the Judge 
system in St. Thomas ‘support corruption’ and the people in 
these high positions are ‘racist’”; and “that one of the reasons 
why the Judge and Jury wouldn’t believe [him] is because the 
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James stated that Cattie “never took the time to explain [to 
him] in detail about the plea agreement” and that he did not 
understand the plea agreement because his “educational level 
is very poor[,] to the point that [he] can’t read or comprehend 
to a level where [he could] trust [Cattie.]”  (App. at 49.)  
Finally, James claimed that no investigation had been made to 
absolve him because Cattie had “already proven [him] guilty 
before any investigation deeply into this case.”  (App. at 49.)   
 
Given James’s allegations, Cattie filed a motion to 
withdraw as his attorney, which was granted.  Joseph 
DiRuzzo was then appointed to represent James and promptly 
moved to withdraw the guilty plea.  In that motion, for the 
first time, James argued that “he was … entrapped by [a] 
confidential informant.”  (App. at 67.)   
 
The District Court denied the withdrawal motion, 
concluding that “James failed to meaningfully assert his 
innocence or provide an adequate reason to withdraw his 
guilty plea[.]”  (App. at 14.)  The Court also stated that 
“[a]ssertions of mere legal innocence [are] insufficient to 
justify the withdrawal of a guilty plea; proof of factual 
innocence is required.”  (App. at 8 (second alteration in 
original) (quoting United States v. Monac, 120 F. App’x 924, 
927 (3d Cir. 2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted).)  
Thus, the District Court ruled that James could not withdraw 
his guilty plea because “an entrapment defense is a claim of 
                                                                                                             
 
Judge supports corruption.”  (App. at 49-50.)  James also 
stated that Cattie told him that he “h[ad] to sign the plea 
because [the new prosecutor on St. Thomas] wouldn’t give 
[him] a [second] chance.”  (App. at 49.) 
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legal innocence, not factual innocence[,]” (App. at 9,) and 
James had failed to assert his factual innocence.  The Court 
went on, however, to note that, “even if James’s assertion of 
legal innocence were sufficient, ‘[b]ald assertions of 
innocence are insufficient to permit a defendant to withdraw 
his guilty plea[,]’” and “James ha[d] not provided the Court 
with any details on how he was entrapped[.]”  (App. at 10 
(first alteration in original).)   
 
James was sentenced to 78 months’ imprisonment, to 
be followed by five years of supervised release, with four 
hundred hours of community service, and a special 
assessment of $100.  He timely appealed.   
 
II. DISCUSSION2 
 
A. The Appellate Waiver 
 
As already noted, James’s plea agreement included a 
waiver of appellate rights.  Because a valid waiver ordinarily 
prevents us from reaching the merits of an appeal, “we review 
the validity of the waiver provision and plea agreement first.”  
United States v. Wilson, 429 F.3d 455, 457 (3d Cir. 2005).   
 
A defendant is free to waive his statutory right to 
appeal.  United States v. Khattak, 273 F.3d 557, 561 (3d Cir. 
2001).  Such a waiver does not deprive us of subject matter 
jurisdiction, but, when the waiver is valid, “we will not 
exercise that jurisdiction to review the merits of [the 
                                                 
2  The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3231 and 48 U.S.C. § 1612.  We have jurisdiction pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
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defendant’s appeal].”  United States v. Gwinnett, 483 F.3d 
200, 203 (3d Cir. 2007).  Typically, instead of dismissing the 
appeal, “we affirm[] the judgment of the district court.”  Id. at 
202.  The government contends that we should do so here.  
This, however, is not the typical case.  Here, “the defendant 
knowingly waive[d] the right to appeal any sentence” (App. 
at 39), but the waiver – crafted by the government – does not 
state that the defendant knowingly waived the right to appeal 
his conviction.  “[W]aivers of appeals should be strictly 
construed.”  Khattak, 273 F.3d at 562.  Thus, the waiver at 
issue, according to its terms, does not bar James’s appeal, see 
United States v. Hernandez, 242 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2001) 
(per curiam) (noting that a waiver that only applies to an 
appeal of the defendant’s “sentence” does not bar an appeal 
of a denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea), and we 
proceed to the merits.    
 
B. James’s Request to Withdraw His Guilty  
Plea 
 
“Once accepted, a guilty plea may not automatically be 
withdrawn at the defendant’s whim.”  United States v. Brown, 
250 F.3d 811, 815 (3d Cir. 2001).  Instead, a defendant may 
withdraw a plea of guilty before sentencing if he “can show a 
fair and just reason for requesting the withdrawal.”  Fed. R. 
Crim. P. 11(d)(2)(B).  To determine if there has been such a 
showing, “[a] district court must consider three factors … (1) 
whether the defendant asserts his innocence; (2) the strength 
of the defendant’s reasons for withdrawing the plea; and (3) 
whether the government would be prejudiced by the 
withdrawal.”  United States v. Jones, 336 F.3d 245, 252 (3d 
Cir. 2003).  The burden of demonstrating those factors “is 
substantial” and “falls on the defendant[.]”  Id.  Whether to 
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grant a motion to withdraw a guilty plea lies within the 
discretion of the district court.  Id.  We will not disturb that 
exercise of discretion unless “no reasonable person would 
adopt the district court’s view.”  United States v. Steiner, 847 
F.3d 103, 110 (3d Cir. 2017) (citation omitted).   
 
James challenges on two bases the District Court’s 
decision to deny his motion to withdraw his guilty plea.  First, 
he says the Court erred in declaring that a claim of legal 
innocence is never sufficient to support withdrawal of a guilty 
plea.  As James sees it, an entrapment defense, while not 
involving factual innocence, can still be a sufficient basis for 
withdrawal.  Second, he says that the District Court abused its 
discretion in weighing the withdrawal factors.  We address 
each argument in turn. 
 
1. James’s Claims of Innocence 
 
a) Legal innocence can support a  
claim of innocence. 
 
Looking first at James’s argument that the District 
Court erred in determining that entrapment can never be a 
sufficient claim of innocence to support withdrawal,  he is 
quite right.  Legal innocence alone can support withdrawal of 
a guilty plea.  As we stated in United States v. Jones, the 
relevant inquiry is “whether the defendant asserts his 
innocence[.]”  336 F.3d at 252.  Innocence has a broader 
meaning than factual innocence.  It denotes being “[f]ree 
from guilt; free from legal fault[,]” which, by definition, 
encompasses being legally excused from any culpability.  See 
Innocent, Black’s Law Dictionary 804 (10th ed. 2014) 
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(defining the term).  In short, legal innocence counts as 
innocence. 
 
Eight of our sister circuits have held that a claim of 
legal innocence can support the withdrawal of a guilty plea.3  
Only one, the Fifth Circuit, has taken a contrary view.4  The 
Advisory Committee’s notes to the 1983 amendments to the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure likewise support the 
view that legal innocence can sustain a guilty plea 
withdrawal.  When the Rules were amended to require that 
the defendant provide a fair and just reason for withdrawal, 
the Advisory Committee said that “[w]hether the movant has 
asserted his legal innocence is an important factor to be 
weighed[.]”  Fed. R. Crim. P. 32 Advisory Committee note to 
                                                 
3  United States v. Barlow, 811 F.3d 133, 135 n.1 (4th 
Cir. 2015); United States v. Maxwell, 498 F.3d 799, 801 (8th 
Cir. 2007); United States v. Hamilton, 510 F.3d 1209, 1214 
(10th Cir. 2007); United States v. Negron-Narvaez, 403 F.3d 
33, 36 (1st Cir. 2005); United States v. Rosen, 409 F.3d 535, 
546 (2d Cir. 2005); United States v. Ortega-Ascanio, 376 
F.3d 879, 883-84, 887 (9th Cir. 2004); United States v. Cray, 
47 F.3d 1203,  1206, 1209 (D.C. Cir. 1995); United States v. 
Groll, 992 F.2d 755, 758 (7th Cir. 1993). 
 
4 See United States v. Lord, 915 F.3d 1009, 1014 (5th 
Cir. 2019) (finding that because defendant’s “arguments do 
not go to their factual innocence” and instead “amount to an 
assertion of their legal innocence,” they are an insufficient 
ground to withdraw a plea); see also id. (“an assertion of 
innocence [i]s not supported by claims of ‘legal innocence 
based on insanity and entrapment’” (citing United States v. 
McKnight, 570 F.3d 641, 649 (5th Cir. 2009))). 
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1983 amendments.  Thus, the weight of authority clearly 
supports treating a claim of legal innocence as an adequate 
assertion of innocence.   
 
So, in our view, does sound logic.  It is axiomatic that 
a defendant who has a complete affirmative defense, such as 
self-defense or entrapment, is not legally culpable.  See, e.g., 
United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 98 (1978) (stating that a 
finding of entrapment “necessarily establish[es] the criminal 
defendant’s lack of criminal culpability” (citation omitted); 
New Orleans & N.E.R. Co. v. Jopes, 142 U.S. 18, 24 (1891) 
(“If the injury was done by the defendant in justifiable self-
defense, he can n[ot] be punished criminally … .  Because the 
act was lawful, he is wholly relieved from responsibility for 
its consequences.”).  Likewise, a juvenile may be shielded 
from criminal liability because of his status as a juvenile.  See 
21 U.S.C. § 861(a) (making it unlawful only “for any person 
at least eighteen years of age to knowingly and intentionally -
- employ … a person under eighteen years of age” in drug 
operations); see also, e.g., Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.04.050 
(“Children under the age of eight years are incapable of 
committing crime.”).  If a defendant is not legally culpable, it 
stands to reason that he should be able to withdraw his guilty 
plea before sentencing because he is exempt from any 
punishment for the alleged acts constituting the crime, 
regardless of whether he committed them. 
 
Despite that, the District Court relied on our decision 
in United States v. Brown, 250 F.3d at 818, to conclude that a 
claim of legal innocence is insufficient to permit a defendant 
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to withdraw his guilty plea.5  More particularly, it relied on 
Brown’s statement that, “[i]n assessing a defendant’s claim of 
‘legal innocence’ for purposes of withdrawal of a guilty plea, 
[courts] must first examine whether the defendant has 
asserted his or her factual innocence.”  Id.  In Brown, we 
placed “legal innocence” in quotes because we were repeating 
a characterization by the defendant of a position she had 
advanced.  Id. at 814, 818.  The defendant asserted that she 
was “legally innocent” because, without certain evidence, the 
government would be unable to prove its case against her 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  Id. at 818.  But she did not 
present any evidence to support the contention that she was 
innocent in fact.  Id.  Thus, Brown did not truly address an 
assertion of innocence – either legal or factual – but rather an 
assertion that there was insufficient evidence to convict.6  
That is an entirely different argument and is certainly not a 
                                                 
5  The Court also cited United States v. Monac, 120 F. 
App’x at 927, and United States v. Kenley, 299 F. App’x 184, 
186 (3d Cir. 2008).  It is contrary to our Internal Operating 
Procedures, however, to treat non-precedential opinions as 
having any precedential effect.  See Third Circuit Internal 
Operating Procedure 5.7 (indicating that non-precedential 
“opinions are not regarded as precedents that bind the court 
because they do not circulate to the full court before filing”).   
 
6  We acknowledge that the Tenth Circuit considered 
Brown as supporting the idea that factual innocence is 
required, while reaching the opposite conclusion as a Circuit.  
Hamilton, 510 F.3d at 1214-15.  We are clarifying the import 
of Brown now. 
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claim of legal innocence.  There is a world of difference 
between saying, on the one hand, “I did it, but the law says 
I’m not culpable,” and, on the other, “I may have done it, but 
you can’t prove it.” 
 
 
 A defense of entrapment is of the former variety and 
can be a proper basis for the withdrawal of a guilty plea.  It 
speaks directly to the legal culpability of the defendant.  
United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 435 (1973).  Not 
surprisingly, then, several courts of appeals have treated a 
well-founded entrapment defense as a sufficient claim of 
innocence.  See, e.g., United States v. Berkeley, 567 F.3d 703, 
708 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“[A]n entrapment defense may 
form the basis for a viable claim of innocence[.]”); United 
States v. Groll, 992 F.2d 755, 759 n.5 (7th Cir. 1993) (“A 
defendant raising an entrapment defense to withdraw her 
guilty plea can, given the nature of the defense, admit to the 
conduct supporting the alleged offense and yet still claim that 
she is legally innocent of the crime.”); see also United States 
v. Chant, 201 F.3d 445, 1999 WL 1021460, at *3 (9th Cir. 
1999) (table) (referring to an entrapment defense as “[a] claim 
of innocence, supported by evidence not available at the time 
of the entry of the plea, [which] might be a fair and just 
reason for allowing withdrawal of a guilty plea”). 
 
 To say that an entrapment defense can support 
withdrawal, however, “is not to say … that the mere assertion 
of a legally cognizable defense is always a sufficient 
condition for securing withdrawal of a plea.”  United States v. 
Barker, 514 F.2d 208, 221 (D.C. Cir. 1975).  On the contrary, 
“[b]ald assertions of innocence are insufficient to permit a 
defendant to withdraw his guilty plea.”  Jones, 336 F.3d at 
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252.   Instead, “[a]ssertions of innocence must be buttressed 
by facts in the record that support a claimed defense.”  
Brown, 250 F.3d at 818 (citation omitted).  In other words, 
“the mere assertion of a legal defense is insufficient; the 
defendant must present a credible claim of legal innocence.”  
Hamilton, 510 F.3d at 1214; see also United States v. 
Thompson-Riviere, 561 F.3d 345, 353 (4th Cir. 2009) (noting 
that the defendant’s burden “is to credibly assert his legal 
innocence: that is, to present evidence that (1) has the ‘quality 
or power of inspiring belief,’ and (2) tends to ‘defeat the 
elements in the government’s prima facie case’ or to ‘make 
out a successful affirmative defense’” (citations omitted)). 
 
Here, the District Court held that it was dealing with 
just such an unsupported claim.  It said that, “even if James’s 
assertion of legal innocence[, entrapment,] were sufficient, 
… .  James ha[d] not provided the Court with any details on 
how he was entrapped, let alone pointed to any evidence of 
the alleged entrapment.”  (App. at 10.)  That is an adequate 
foundation on which to conclude that James’s claim of legal 
innocence was insufficient to be a ground for withdrawal of 
his guilty plea, making the District Court’s earlier legal error 
harmless.   
 
b) James’s claims of innocence are  
insufficient. 
 
James disputes that the District Court’s conclusion in 
that regard and says the Court abused its discretion in denying 
his withdrawal motion since he “plausibly claimed his 
innocence (both factual and legal) and … proffered legitimate 
reasons explaining why he first pled guilty and then made the 
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request to withdraw it.”  (Opening Br. at 5.)  We have a very 
different understanding of the record and his arguments. 
 
James’s claim of entrapment was a “[b]ald assertion[] 
of innocence” that was not “buttressed by facts in the record 
that support [his] claimed defense.”  Jones, 336 F.3d at 252 
(citation omitted).  The defense of entrapment requires proof 
of two elements: “[1] government inducement of the crime, 
and [2] a lack of predisposition on the part of the defendant to 
engage in the criminal conduct.”  Matthews v. United States, 
485 U.S. 58, 63 (1988).  James argues that he sufficiently 
alleged inducement because of “the involvement of the 
confidential informant” and that he showed a lack of 
predisposition because of his “complete lack of any criminal 
history[.]”  (Opening Br. at 11.)  It is a stretch to read his 
filings in the District Court as alleging both elements, but we 
will assume for the sake of discussion that he did.  The 
question, then, is whether he provided any evidentiary 
support.   
 
James says that he showed inducement because it was 
the informant who put together the drug deal, despite James’s 
“repeated and consistent claims that he did not want to be 
involved[.]”  (Opening Br. at 16.)  As evidence of reluctance, 
he cites to the plea colloquy, which notes that “several phone 
calls and conversations [occurred] between Kenneth James 
and the confidential source[.]”  (App. at 60.)  That’s the 
entirety of his proof, beyond his self-serving statements.  But 
the fact that several calls took place does not prove that those 
calls were needed to overcome any reluctance on James’s 
part.  And, as we explained in United States v. Wright, “mere 
solicitation by the government, without more, is not 
‘inducement.’”  921 F.2d 42, 45 (3d Cir. 1990).  To be 
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inducement, the government’s actions must have 
overpowered the defendant.  Cf. Groll, 992 F.2d at 759 
(noting that “three phone calls urging a defendant to buy 
cocaine after an initial refusal were not sufficient 
inducement” but that an informant calling a defendant every 
day for a month raised a colorable claim).  At most, James 
has provided evidence that repeated calls were made.  The 
content of those calls is simply not in evidence.  The District 
Court thus did not abuse its discretion in concluding that 
James had not given sufficient support for a defense of 
entrapment.  See, e.g., United States v. Hanson, 339 F.3d 983, 
988 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (rejecting an “extremely weak[,]” 
though not completely unviable, entrapment defense as a 
basis for asserting innocence). 
 
Since James did not provide a meaningful basis to 
conclude that the government induced him to commit the 
crime to which he pled guilty, it does not matter whether he 
showed a lack of predisposition to commit the crime.  The 
District Court was within its discretion in rejecting his 
entrapment defense as a basis for withdrawing his plea. 
 
James also takes a pass at what one might interpret as a 
claim of factual innocence.  He contends that he could not 
have had the requisite “intent” to distribute narcotics because 
the bag containing the drugs was not his and “he did not 
know what was in the bag[] of drugs until he was arrested[.]” 
(Opening Br. at 5.)  But, in all of this it must be remembered 
that James admitted under oath to the underlying facts of the 
offense during the plea colloquy and made no mention of 
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inducement then.7  His factual admissions “carry a strong 
presumption of verity.”  Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 
74 (1977).  Thus, given his earlier admissions, including that 
he negotiated the price for the cocaine on a per-kilo basis, 
there was no abuse of discretion in rejecting his late and lame 
protestations of factual innocence, if he actually presented 
them to the District Court. 
 
2. Weighing the Remaining Withdrawal  
Factors 
 
The second factor in assessing whether a guilty plea 
can be withdrawn is whether the defendant has proffered 
“sufficient reasons to explain why contradictory positions 
were taken before the district court and why permission 
should be given to withdraw the guilty plea and reclaim the 
right to trial.”  Jones, 336 F.3d at 253 (citation omitted).  
James gives three reasons why he should have been allowed 
to withdraw his plea.  First, he says the plea was not 
voluntary since “he felt threatened under duress to accept a 
plea that he would not have accepted[.]”  (Opening Br. at 8.)  
Second, he claims the plea was not entered into knowingly, 
that it was not an “intelligent act[] done with sufficient 
awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely 
consequences.”  (Opening Br. at 6 (quoting Brady v. United 
                                                 
7 During the plea colloquy, James agreed that the 
government could prove certain facts beyond a reasonable 
doubt, including that “James[] arranged with individuals 
unknown, to provide approximately 12 kilograms of cocaine 
to a DEA confidential source” and that “James negotiated to 
sell each kilo of cocaine to the confidential source for 
$13,500.”  (App. at 60-61.)   
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States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970)).)  Third, he claims that his 
counsel was ineffective.  The record does not support any of 
those assertions.  
 
As to his first argument, that he was under duress 
“because his attorney told him that the judge system in St. 
Thomas is corrupt and the judge and jury would not believe 
his defense[]” (Opening Br. at 8), James has offered 
absolutely no evidence of corruption, nor any rational reason 
why he would have believed such a tale, even if it were told.  
In fact, as the District Court stated, “it seems that a reasonable 
defendant, believing he faced sentencing at the hands of a 
corrupt and biased judge, would be hesitant to forgo the 
protections afforded by a jury trial.”  (App at 13.)   
 
The record is not simply bereft of anything supporting 
James’s assertions about what Cattie said; it is plainly 
contrary to those assertions.  As in Jones, where the 
defendant later contended his counsel made a promise that 
induced him to plead guilty, the District Court here “engaged 
[James] in a lengthy and extensive colloquy … during which 
the Court asked [him] whether anyone had made any threat or 
promise or assurance of any kind to convince him to plead 
guilty.  He replied in the negative.”  336 F.3d at 254.  Indeed, 
James affirmed that he was “entering th[e] plea of [his] own 
free will.”  (App. at 58.)  Having pointed to nothing that 
undermines those statements, James cannot credibly argue 
that the District Court abused its discretion in concluding that 
his late-breaking and unsupported assertion of duress did not 
favor granting the motion for withdrawal.8  Cf. United States 
                                                 
8  Nonetheless, James contends that, “[i]n prior 
decisions, this Court has considered the accused’s familiarity 
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v. Fazio, 795 F.3d 421, 426 (3d Cir. 2015) (noting that such 
statements at a plea colloquy mean that an “appellate waiver 
must … be enforced unless we identify the unusual 
circumstance of an error amounting to a miscarriage of 
justice” (citation omitted)).  
 
James next argues that his plea was not a knowing, 
“intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action 
open to the defendant.”  Jones, 336 F.3d at 253 (citation 
omitted).  He advances two reasons.  First, he makes the 
bootstrap argument that, if it is true that the system in St. 
Thomas is not corrupt, then “James made his plea without 
sufficient awareness of the fair and impartial process he 
would receive presenting his defense[.]”  (Opening Br. at 8.)  
Second, he says that, because of his “lack of education” he 
was unable to make an informed decision about the 
alternative courses of action available to him.  (Opening Br. 
at 8.)   
 
Both of those arguments fail because James’s 
statements during the change-of-plea hearing indicate that his 
plea was indeed knowing, voluntary, and fully informed.  As 
                                                                                                             
 
with the justice system in determining whether a plea was 
made voluntarily[.]”  (Opening Br. at 8 (citing Jones, 336 
F.3d at 254-55).)  Since this was James’s “first touch with the 
judicial system[,]” (App. at 88,) he argues we should find his 
plea involuntary, given the claims he has asserted.  But 
simply because we consider the accused’s familiarity with the 
criminal justice system does not make that consideration 
dispositive. 
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the District Court observed, any allegation that James’s plea 
was not entered into knowingly and voluntarily is “flatly 
contradicted by [his] statements at the plea colloquy that he 
‘read[s] and write[s] in English’ and had ‘had an opportunity 
to have the documents in this case explained to [him]’” (App. 
at 14 (alterations in original) (citation omitted),) and by his 
affirmative responses when asked if he was competent, if the 
plea agreement had been explained to him, and if he had had 
a full opportunity to make an informed decision.  As to 
James’s level of education, the District Court, being the 
appropriate finder of fact, determined that James’s pro se 
motion was presented “coherently[.]”  (App. at 14.)  Thus, the 
District Court could fairly conclude that James had the 
requisite understanding and information to enter a guilty plea 
and that he did so knowingly and voluntarily.   
 
Finally, James contends that his counsel was 
ineffective.  He attempts to bolster that assertion by pointing 
out that he requested new counsel.  A valid claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel can negate the intelligent and 
voluntary nature of a guilty plea and provide a basis for 
withdrawing it.  Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56-58 (1985).  
But the “‘narrow exception to the rule that defendants cannot 
attack the efficacy of their counsel on direct appeal’ [only] 
exists ‘[w]here the record is sufficient to allow determination 
of ineffective assistance of counsel.’”  Jones, 336 F.3d at 254 
(second alteration in original) (citation omitted).  A “court 
will permit a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea based on 
ineffective assistance of counsel only if (1) the defendant 
shows that his attorney’s advice was under all the 
circumstances unreasonable under prevailing professional 
norms; and (2) the defendant shows that he suffered 
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‘sufficient prejudice’ from his counsel’s errors.”  Id. at 253-
54 (citations omitted).  James has not supported either prong. 
 
As to the first, James again relies on his self-serving 
and uncorroborated claims that Cattie told him that Judge 
Gomez is corrupt; that Cattie “never took the time to explain 
[to him] in detail about the plea agreement[;]” and that Cattie 
did not investigate his case.  (Opening Br. at 3.)  His mere 
assertions are not enough.  See Jones, 336 F.3d at 255 (“Jones 
has not pointed to any specific act or omission or objective 
evidence to support his blanket contentions.”).  
“Significantly, during the plea colloquy, James averred that 
… he was ‘satisfied with the representation [he had] received 
from [Attorney Cattie].’”  (App. at 12 (second and third 
alterations in original) (citation omitted).)  That alone, given 
the rest of this record, is a sufficient ground to disallow a 
charge of ineffective assistance of counsel as a basis for 
withdrawal of the guilty plea.  See United States v. Erwin, 
765 F.3d 219, 226 (3d Cir. 2014) (enforcing a waiver based 
on a defendant’s responses during plea colloquy).  Moreover, 
in Cattie’s motion to withdraw as counsel, he represented that 
he had met with James on multiple occasions, discussed the 
plea agreement, investigated the claims against James, and 
never maligned the Court.  The District Court could properly 
decide on this record, without abusing its discretion, that that 
version of events was more likely the accurate one.   
 
James has also failed to establish the prejudice prong.  
A defendant must show that “there is a reasonable probability 
that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different.  A reasonable 
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence 
in the outcome.”  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 
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694 (1984).  James has not provided any reason, yet again 
aside from his own self-serving statements, to believe that 
Cattie’s alleged conduct caused him to forgo a jury trial and 
admit guilt. 
 
Because neither James’s assertions of innocence nor 
any of his other reasons for withdrawal favored granting his 
motion, the District Court was not required to evaluate the 
prejudice to the government.  See Jones, 336 F.3d at 255 
(“[T]he Government need not show such prejudice when a 
defendant has failed to demonstrate that the other factors 
support a withdrawal of the plea.”).  Having reasonably 
determined that the relevant legal factors did not favor 
James’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea, the District Court 
was within its discretion to deny the motion. 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
  
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of 
the District Court. 
